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The paper aims to discuss the role played by derivatives in the financial crisis and to identify whether it 
is these instruments or other factors that were behind it. Moreover, it looks at literature on control 
systems within the firms throughout the aforementioned event, to identify and bring to light any flaws 
and gaps. Moreover, it highlights opinions of persons involved, testimonies, papers and reports drawn-
up, the lessons learnt and their mitigating factors, in order to enable address of the issues and avoid 
replay. The article suggests that many factors contributed to the quick deterioration in credit markets 
and large losses. Although, this has sometimes been attributed to one single main factor (i.e. the 
massive interlocking web of Over the Counter derivatives exposures), to take down the entire financial 
system would have taken more than just this. There are arguments both in favour and against this 
opinion, however the fact may be that a mixture of the exploitation of the New Financial Architecture 
self regulatory model by unethical traders, compounded by the fact that the financial structure allowed 
the financial institutions to set inflated prices on derivatives with unknown values, such as Credit 
Default Swaps could have been the culprit. Therefore, to avoid replay, there is need for transparency 
and accountability as proposed by the European Commission and also an external regulatory 
framework that stops unethical traders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Summers [1], singled out derivatives as being the cause 
of the “Great Financial Crisis”. He argues that since 2007, 
although an extensive amount of research reports and 
articles have addressed the crisis, not much has been 
written about what caused it and on how the various 
efforts to stop it have failed to identify and address the 
main issue. He relates that in 2007, subprime mortgages 
were blamed, in 2008, investment banks, specifically the 
Lehman Brothers failure and AIG‟s credit default swaps 
and in 2009, poor accounting standards and bad bets 
made on Wall Street took the blame. The argument 
remains the same for 2010, with the blame put on bad 
bets made by Wall Street. He however explains that they 
fail to address the underlying issue that links all. He 
describes this as the “Black Hole of Finance: a 
bottomless pit that no official or regulator bothers 
mentioning in public, because acknowledging it would 
mean acknowledging that all of the efforts to stop the 
crisis are truly paltry”. 
The Role Played by Derivatives in The Financial 
Crisis 
 
The global financial crisis, described by George Sorus as 
the "worst financial crisis" since the Great Depression [2] 
resulted mainly due to large losses incurred in the 
derivatives markets by companies, especially because of 
over the counter derivatives (OTC), specifically credit 
default swaps (CDS). Internal Market and Services 
Commissioner Charlie McCreevy stated that derivatives 
markets have a significant function in the economy. 
However the current crisis has revealed the harm they 
may bring to financial stability [3]. 
Murphy [4] describes CDSs as the “poster child for the 
(alleged) failure of the deregulated financial sector”. His 
worry is that since these are contracts that are traded 
OTC; no one will know their exact exposure, which he 
notes is suspected to be within the US$50 trillion as at 
end 2007. In fact, an ISDA market survey, reported that,  
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Table 1. ISDA Market Survey Notional amounts outstanding at year-end, all surveyed contracts, 1987-present (Notional amounts in 
billions of US dollars) [6] 
 
 
Year-end outstandings 
for interest rate swaps 
Year-end 
outstandings 
currency swaps 
Year-end 
outstandings for 
interest rate  options 
Total IR and 
currency 
outstanding 
Total credit 
default swap 
outstandings 
Total equity 
derivative 
outstandings 
1987 682.80 182.80  865.60   
1988 1,010.20 316.80 327.30 1,654.30   
1989 1,502.60 434.90 537.30 2,474.70   
1990 2,311.54 577.53 561.30 3,450.30   
1991 3,065.10 807.67 577.20 4,449.50   
1992 3,850.81 860.39 634.50 5,345.70   
1993 6,177.35 899.62 1,397.60 8,474.50   
1994 8,815.56 914.85 1,572.80 11,303.20   
1995 12,810.74 1,197.39 3,704.50 17,712.60   
1996 19,170.91 1,059.64 4,722.60 25,453.10   
1997 22,291.33 1,823.63 4,920.10 29,035.00   
1998    50,997.00   
1999    58,265.00   
2000    63,009.00   
2001    69,207.30 918.87  
2002    101,318.49 2,191.57 2,455.29 
2003    142,306.92 3,779.40 3,444.08 
2004    183,583.27 8,422.26 4,151.29 
2005    213,194.58 17,096.14 5,553.97 
2006    285,728.14 34,422.80 7,178.48 
2007    382,302.71 62,173.20 9,995.71 
2008    403,072.81 38,563.82 8,733.03 
2009    426,749.60 30,428.11 6,771.58 
 
 
 
although CDSs have existed since the early 1990s, the 
market only increased tremendously starting in 2003. As 
noted in table 1, by the end of 2007, the outstanding 
amount was US$62.2 trillion, falling to US$38.6 trillion by 
the end of 2008 and US$30.4 trillion in 2009. 
Gilani [5], explains in an article in the Market Oracle - 
Money Morning, that these CDSs were devised by 
bankers - J. P. Morgan and Co. now JP Morgan Chase 
and Co. (JPM ), in the early 1990s, in order to hedge their 
loan risks. He defines them as an “insurance contract 
between a protection buyer and a protection seller 
covering a corporation's, or sovereign's (the „referenced 
entity‟), specific bond or loan. The protection buyer than 
pays an upfront amount and yearly premiums to the 
protection seller to cover any loss on the face amount of 
the referenced bond or loan”. In other words CDSs are 
supposed to work similar to a normal insurance taken out 
to protect against theft or fire. The buyer pays a premium 
over a period of time in order to receive “peace of mind,” 
that any losses will be covered in case of default. 
However, although at face value they might look like 
insurance contracts, they are not. Insurance companies 
and Banks, with the latter being the most active on this 
market, are regulated, while the CDSs markets are not. 
Therefore, there is no one to oversee and ensure that the 
buyer has enough resources to cover the losses if the 
security defaults. This makes it tougher for banks to 
value. At the end of the 3
rd
 quarter of 2007, according to 
the Comptroller of the Currency, a federal banking 
regulator, the top 25 held more than US$13 trillion in 
CDSs, acting as either the insurer or the insured. The top 
4 most active where, JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank 
of America and Wachovia [7]. 
In his testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, regarding “the role of OTC derivatives in the 
financial crisis”, Masters [8], states that although the 
financial crisis was caused by various factors, 
unregulated derivatives played an important and  
 
 
 
 
distinctive dangerous role. He explained that unregulated 
credit derivatives, were mostly responsible for creating, 
from isolated problems, a systemic risk that turned the 
crisis into one that became system-wide and that 
unregulated commodity derivatives created disproportionate 
volatility in commodities prices, which put more pressure 
on the economy, which was at the time still suffering from 
the effects of the financial crisis. 
Masters [8] highlights the systemic risk that the OTC 
derivatives created because of the unclear “web of 
interconnections” between institutions and their markets, 
which lowered counterparty confidence, putting credit 
markets to a stall. He also noted that OTC derivatives 
facilitated and encouraged increased speculation in 
important commodities on which the economy runs, such 
as food and energy. This created volatility, which 
included the harmful type of speculation labelled “index 
speculation,” (speculate on the performance of a 
portfolio/basket – creating unrealistic prices) benefitted 
dealers (who placed bets on commodities) but harmed 
the rest of the economy.  
He highlighted that the causes of the financial crisis 
(the fall in housing prices, the unsound lending practices, 
the securitisation of mortgages, the poor assessments of 
securities by ratings agencies and the very low interest 
rates while Alan Greenspan was chairman of the Federal 
Reserve) resulted in more cash available to invest than 
the fixed-income investments availability. However, he 
argued that even if all the above-mentioned failures 
happened together, they would not have been enough to 
“threaten” the whole financial system. Although systemic 
risk was created by complex, unclear inter-relationships, 
brought on by the mortgage market itself, OTC 
derivatives had to be present. These hidden connections 
existed between financial institutions, different financial 
markets and the latter and non-financial markets and 
were made possible by the presence of unregulated OTC 
derivatives [8]. 
 
What Led to the Financial Crisis 
 
Masters [8] explained that the Commodity Exchange Act 
in 1936, which recognised the derivatives market for 
consumable commodities, enabled the futures market to 
functions well for more than 50 years, since it allowed 
regulators to monitor and police the commodities futures 
markets to ensure that they are free from fraud, 
manipulation and excessive speculation. The fact that 
these derivatives were not allowed to trade off-exchange 
and had to be cleared centrally, was an additional 
safeguard against systemic risk. However, in 2000, the 
Commodities Futures Modernisation Act (CFMA) 
changed the previously stable system, allowing trading 
without limits on speculative position on the Exempt 
Commercial Markets (ECM) and the CFTC regulations of 
Designated Commercial Markets (DCM). This legislation 
was based on the erroneous conviction that a few 
consumable commodities, example crude oil, were not 
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prone to manipulation since they had large deliverable 
supplies.  
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and derivatives 
were each of enough size to cause major losses alone. 
Swaps grew by an estimated US$590 trillion between 
June 2000 to June 2008. At this same time, total MBSs, 
another key player in this crisis, stood at around $14 
trillion. Masters 
8 
explained that deregulation encouraged 
the quick growth in leverage and interconnectedness. 
Thereby, the futures market post 1936 saw derivatives 
trading OTCs, with little transparency and controls and 
protected from any type of regulatory action or penalty for 
having committed fraud and/or manipulation. This lack of 
transparency in OTC derivatives enabled dealers to make 
large profits from wider bid-ask spreads, because they 
had an informational advantage over their customers. 
Moreover, since they have a privileged position, dealers 
could control the information into the futures exchanges 
and other regulated markets (which were used when 
dealers were unable to hedge transactions using other 
OTC customer). Thereby, timing their orders to maximise 
profits and consequentially “distorting the price discovery 
mechanism within the public markets” [8].  
According to Masters [8],
 
OTC derivatives before the 
crisis posed the risk of a potential domino effect on all 
dealers, if one dealer failed. This because of the 
“interlocking web” of extensive exposures among the key 
swaps dealers [8]. Moreover, for the first domino to fall, 
losses did not have to be very large since the market was 
characterised by a large leverage position (margin 
requirement). It was not possible for counterparties‟ to 
assess risk and this resulted in systematic risk. The 
solvency of all counterparties are questioned when some 
negative news regarding one or more large 
counterparties comes out. Therefore, the perception of 
risk, alone could have been sufficient to put credit 
markets at a standstill and make the whole financial 
sector and real economy unstable. The danger as seen 
by Masters [8], was not only a function of the ability to 
disseminate losses around many markets and types of 
users, but one of lack of transparency created by 
deregulation and uncertainty (due to an opaque 
environment). 
 
Mitigating Measures and Counterarguments 
 
Masters [8] notes that the only way to eliminate this 
systematic risk is through a requirement to have all OTC 
derivatives cleared through a clearing system with a 
central counterparty (CCP) and novation, i.e. a “Designated 
Clearing Organisation (DCO).” He also notes that 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
have, years ago, published guidelines for standardisation 
of all derivatives agreements (ISDA agreements). It was 
difficult for a regulator to be alarmed with limited 
transparency and no position limits requirements. 
If firms were required to go through a DCO, the 
regulator would not have been at the mercy of the 
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expertise of the regulated companies‟ risk management, 
who as Masters [8] notes in hindsight, were not as able in 
assessing risks as they alleged themselves to be. Such a 
clearing system, would have stopped the systemic risk 
“posed by the interlocking web of interconnected 
counterparties”
 
[8], since all participants using derivatives 
would have had just one central counterparty. This 
according to Masters
8
 would also have removed the 
danger of excessive leverage, since margin requirements 
would have been imposed and transaction would be 
backed by sufficient collateral. That is, the risk to the 
economy of failure of a single holder of derivatives 
(regardless of the magnitude) will be very low, because of 
the appropriate margin requirements. The risk of a 
clearinghouse default would be the only risk to all 
participants and this would be easily ascertainable 
because of transparency.  
Masters [8] however explains that there have been 
arguments on the fact that the many firms that failed, or 
were close to collapsing, would have failed just the same, 
even if derivatives were not present. Their argument was 
based on the fact that Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) 
and not derivatives were behind the preliminary losses 
that started off the crisis. He highlighted that MBS are not 
“true derivatives” although their value is “derived from the 
value of the underlying mortgages” [8]. 
However, he also brings up one exception to 
Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) (which is a form of 
MBS and not a derivative), a “synthetic CDO”, which is a 
kind of CDS and thereby is a derivative.  
Moreover, Jensen [9] on his web-site comments that 
standardisation of OTC derivatives “would limit the ability 
of companies to fully manage their risks". He notes that 
the popularity of OTC derivatives is due to the fact that 
they allow traders to write customised hedging contracts 
to reflect exactly what is required. If the contracts are 
standardised it would be difficult or impossible to achieve 
a hedge that perfectly matches the needs of the trader. 
Gibson [10] relates that “a synthetic CDO is a 
transaction that transfers the credit risk on a reference 
portfolio of assets.” He states that this reference portfolio 
is made up of CDSs and like Masters
8
 classifies it as a 
credit derivative. In fact, he notes that “much of the risk 
transfer that occurs in the credit derivatives market is in 
the form of synthetic CDOs.” Gibson [10] explains, that 
these instruments help to divide the risk of loss on a 
reference portfolio into tranches of increasing seniority. 
He explains that any losses will first affect the first loss 
tranche (equity), next the “mezzanine" tranche(s), and 
finally the “senior" and “super-senior" tranches. By selling 
credit protection to the CDO issuer, investors take on 
exposure to a specific tranche. On the other hand “the 
issuer hedges this risk by selling credit protection on the 
reference portfolio in the form of a single-name CDS. 
Parties on the other side of these hedging transactions 
are the ultimate sellers of credit risk to the CDO investor, 
with the CDO issuer acting as intermediary” [10].  
 
 
 
 
Masters [8] suggests that one has to consider the impact 
of all these instruments distinctly when looking at the role 
derivatives played in the crisis. He notes that “between 
September 16th, 2008 and the end of 2008, AIG paid out 
$22.4 billion of government bailout funds in collateral 
postings to CDS counterparties and $36.7 billion to its 
securities lending counterparties, which partly acted to 
cover draw-downs from” AIG‟s MBS losses
8
. He also 
notes that “the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)”, 
reported that most of the “bailout funds, for fiscal year 
2009 were channelled into AIGFP for collateral postings 
on CDS, GIA and other debt maturities ($50.6 billion vs. a 
combined $27.9 billion to make good on its own MBS 
related losses, as well as those of its insurance 
subsidiaries). AIG faced large losses on its MBS holdings 
and on its synthetic CDO portfolio (CDS on CDOs)”
 
[8]. 
Later, as AIGs credit rating deteriorated because of its‟ 
poor performing MBS holdings, more collateral was 
demanded from its CDS counterparties. This brought AIG 
to a point which, together with the losses on MBSs, made 
it insolvent. Masters
8
 stated that he has no doubt that 
derivatives were involved in creating the danger to the 
economy and that this can‟t be attributed to MBS alone. 
With MBS alone, it would have been relatively easy to 
estimate the probable losses for major financial 
institutions. However, regulators and the counterparties 
were not in a position to trace the labyrinthine 
associations created by CDS and other unregulated OTC 
derivatives [8]. 
This opacity, made possible by unregulated OTC 
derivatives developed into an environment full of 
uncertainty over counterparty risk. This pushed towards 
the extreme total suspension of lending. Therefore, 
although Masters [8] agrees that that MBS alone could 
have caused several large institutions to fail, he argues 
that derivatives were needed to endanger the whole 
system. 
Garrett [11] notes that most of the time, especially 
when the gossip falls on derivatives, opinion is mistaken 
for fact. Unfortunately, as Garrett [11] continues to 
explain, derivatives have been “demonised” by many who 
choose to disseminate myths about these products, 
instead of developing their knowledge and understanding 
of their mechanisms. According to Garrett [11] it is 
important to dismiss these myths and understand the 
impacts and reality of these instruments. Only in this way 
will justice be done with those taxpayers who have 
funded trillions of dollars in bailouts and the many 
businesses and investment managers that depend on 
derivatives to manage risk. 
Garrett [11] argues that these myths are extended to 
the whole OTC derivatives markets and most of the time 
fail to account for the large variety of products available 
to firms within this market. He explains that more often 
than not, it is argued that one should use a 
“sledgehammer” instead of the “scalpel” that would 
satisfactorily do the job. In Garrett‟s [11] opinion, the role  
 
 
 
 
derivatives played in the current financial crisis was 
minimal. He sees the proposed requirement to have a 
clearing mechanism for all derivatives products and the 
application of regulations similar to those of banks to 
market participants, which are non-banks, as a “knee-
jerk” reaction that threatens to damage both the financial 
markets and non-financial companies that are needed to 
create economic growth. 
Garrett [11] clarifies the persistent myth that the failure 
of Lehman Brothers had caused the “cardiac arrest” of 
AIG because of AIG‟s exposure of CDSs to Lehman. He 
notes that Lehman‟s derivatives contracts were settled 
within a month of its bankruptcy and AIG had to pay out 
only a comparatively small amount of US$6.2 million on 
its Lehman exposure. Furthermore, he notes that "market 
fragility" was the reason highlighted by the Federal 
Reserve as its cause for intervention and rescuing AIG, 
and not derivatives. AIG's health failure was attributed to 
incompetent risk assessment of its MBS and CDO 
portfolios. 
Garrett [11] sees that the main contributors to the 
economic chaos in the financial crisis were the meagre 
housing finance, ill-advised regulatory policy and lax 
supervision. In his opinion, whether the losses resulted 
from mortgage loans, mortgage-backed securities, or 
CDSs that guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, the 
real problem was that numerous mortgage loans were 
made to persons who could not afford to make their 
payments. Also, regulators failed to identify and manage 
the risk of these loose lending standards. Garrett
11
 
expresses his concern that the regulatory policies and 
“distorted” incentives that in his opinion produced this 
crisis are sadly still there. He notes that to fix them will 
upset established constituencies and some politicians' 
long-time supporters. Garrett
11
 strongly argues that 
developing a new regulatory structure for derivatives 
would not address the real problem. In his opinion, this 
issue will not be resolved by attacking derivatives. He 
notes further, the importance of derivative products for 
managing a diversification of risks and hedging a 
diversity of exposures. They allow for the transformation 
from an illiquid risk to a traded one and give firms the 
ability to trade risks that they do not require, so as to 
concentrate on their core business. Derivatives are used 
by a multiple of industries spanning from manufacturing, 
exporting, agribusiness and energy to protect consumers 
against for example energy and food price spikes. 
Therefore, good risk management involving derivatives, 
reduces the consumers‟ costs, increases economic 
growth and creates additional jobs. Over-spilling on 
regulation or poor regulation that might look good 
politically could have negative consequences for both the 
financial markets and the global economy. It could 
aggravate risks further, rather than reduce them. As 
noted above, the requirement to have a clearing system 
in place for all derivatives contracts and to insist on 
applying regulations similar to the ones for banks, to  
Grima               269 
 
 
 
derivatives dealers are the two most frequently 
mentioned options for derivatives regulation [11] 
Requiring derivatives contracts to be carried out through 
a central clearinghouse, in Garrett‟s [11] opinion has the 
potential to restrict market liquidity and reduces the firms‟ 
hedging ability. The plan advocated by the Obama 
administration for regulatory reform, which is supported 
by House Democrats extends greatly the faulty banking-
style regulations to businesses. It requires the application 
of capital requirements, business conduct rules, and 
margin requirements to users of derivatives. This will tie 
up firm‟s capital, which could be used to promote 
business development
11
. It is senseless to require a 
regulatory framework that did not work and was not able 
to ensure stability and soundness for banks, for 
derivatives users.  
According to Garrett [11], the deficiencies of these 
regulations should be determined and not just be 
overwhelmed by the bad investment decisions of some 
high-profile institutions that used derivatives. He notes 
the fact that these happened while under the supervision 
of their regulators. Therefore, he calls for an examination 
of derivatives and their uses and the reasons why things 
went sour, to come to a conclusion on the best way to fix 
this financial market without damaging the derivatives 
business. Garrett [11] concludes by noting this fact: “no 
doubt greater expertise among regulators is required, a 
notion reinforced by the fact that AIG was a regulated 
entity.” 
 
OTC Derivatives and Lack of Transparency 
 
Master [8] explains that the lack of transparency lead to 
rumours that large investment banks and other 
institutions were facing difficulties. This, as he continues 
explaining generated fear in lenders of counterparty 
default. Reliable information to enable the assessment of 
individual firms‟ creditworthiness was also lacking since 
most of their risks in derivatives were held off-balance 
sheet. This resulted in a “universal freezing of lending”. 
Therefore, perception played a large part in the financial 
crisis. Although brought on by the lack of transparency 
existing in the market, there was a spill-over into other 
markets and onto other asset classes where 
transparency and regulation was required.  
Also, as Masters [8] explains further, speculation in 
OTC derivatives effected the price-discovery mechanism 
underlying physical commodities. This was unrealistically 
subjected to the activities of financial market participants, 
rather than the actual producers and consumers of 
commodities‟ underlying supply and demand. These 
derivatives facilitated disproportionate speculation 
(including index speculation), which brought on increased 
volatility in prices. A distortion in real commodity prices 
was created by OTC derivatives speculation. This 
burdened households and businesses further, at a time 
when they were already feeling the effects of a financial 
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crisis on credit and their balance sheets.  
Moreover, Masters [8] continues in his testimony to 
explain that the bid-ask spreads were widened because 
of the lack of transparency. This, in turn increases the 
costs of hedging for the end users. Dealers are at a huge 
informational advantage. Therefore customers who see 
only the quoted prices offered by their dealer are at a 
disadvantaged position, or as Masters
8
 puts it a 
„dangerous position‟, in particular when dealing with 
products which are highly customised. 
Masters [8] argues in favour of regulation to increase 
transparency and liquidity, although he says that various 
OTC derivative dealers (which he describes as ironic) 
have argued against this, claiming that this would have 
the opposite effect. He notes that experience shows, that 
some of the largest profits are made from customers 
pressured to exit their positions. Since, these are faced 
only by a black box with the only source of information 
being that provided by the dealer. Masters [8], compares 
this OTC derivatives‟ market to a game of poker where 
the player is made to play with his cards exposed in full 
view for his opponent and all to see, the derivatives 
dealer, having a full view of all his cards. Therefore, he is 
able to take advantage of this information to the 
maximum degree possible. This advantage would not 
exist on a transparent exchange and therefore the price 
spreads would become thinner. 
According to Masters [8], experts in the field have 
noted that the extra costs paid by end users for posting a 
margin would be offset by the savings on this narrowing 
effect and having a transparent exchange for all derivatives 
would make sure that there is a liquid market for traders 
at whatever side of the market they are representing. 
 
OTC Derivatives and Hidden Risks 
 
Masters [8] notes that a further danger posed by OTC 
derivatives, is that they hide risks from counterparties, 
regulators, and at times the institution holding the 
derivatives themselves. He further notes, that among the 
leading buyers of CDS agreements known as “regulatory 
capital swaps,” (or “balance sheet rentals”) were 
European banks. These agreements were suppose to 
have hedged the risks and therefore allowed buyers to 
take increased leverage. The truth was that these risks 
were really moved off-balance sheet and formed part of 
the swaps‟ counterparty risk. European banks purchased 
around $426 billion of these CDSs from AIG in 2007 and 
a lot of these were used to avoid regulatory capital 
requirements. This helped in spreading the crisis around 
the world when the financial crisis hit [8].  
Derivatives have a vital role in the economy but also 
expose it to some risks. The financial crisis and the 
events surrounding Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers and 
AIG, to mention a few large events, have brought to light 
the fact that these risks are not adequately mitigated in  
that part of the market for OTCs, which includes CDS. 
Although, the US, the EU and the G20 countries have 
 
 
 
 
agreed that regulation is necessary, there are many 
arguments to the contrary and to whether such will 
deliver an “efficient, safe and sound derivatives market”
 3
. 
Some have argued that this regulation is essential, 
because the OTC derivatives market has proven to be 
unethical and bloodsucking speculators exploited the lack 
of regulation and “raked in hundreds of billions in 
excessive profits, juicy fees and obscenely high year-end 
bonuses” [12].  
However, the European Commission [3], after taking 
into account the wide diversity of OTC derivatives 
markets, has in a communication listed the requirements 
it deemed necessary to ensure that they (derivatives) do 
not harm financial stability while enabling them to 
complete their economic role. To ensure this the 
European Commission [3] considered that actions should 
be undertaken so as to ensure that:  
 
a) Regulators and supervisors are fully aware and 
knowledgeable of the OTC derivatives markets 
transactions and the exposures being built in those 
markets  
b) Superior information about prices and volumes should 
be more readily available (more transparency) 
c) The operational efficiency of the derivatives markets is 
strengthened and  
d) Enable mitigation of counterparty risks and promotes 
centralised structures.  
 
The Commission [3], noted that the core tools for 
reaching these goals are: 
 
(i) promotion of more standardisation, 
(ii) the use of central data repositories, 
(iii) changing to CCP clearing, and  
(iv) steering trading towards more public trading venues 
 
CDS – A Political as well as a Financial Problem 
 
Tremblay [12] blames human greed and political 
corruption as being the primary driver behind the crisis. 
He notes that the global crisis has been based upon “an 
unstable, unsustainable pyramid of artificial debt”, built to 
the advantage of unregulated financial operators who 
made a lot of money. The problem is both a political one 
and a financial one. It is a mixture of “political corruption” 
and “racketeering financial and banking practices” that 
provide the right ingredients for a major crisis to 
develop
12
. The Financial Crisis as Tremblay [12] recalls 
was supported by Politicians supported in order to create 
a booming economy. The political support can be seen 
with the increased deregulation in the derivatives 
markets, allowing high risk trading and resulting in 
booming economies. However, this boom relied on 
increased lending and the increase of bad debts, which  
were then sold through the use of short selling of any 
derivative creating an “artificial pyramid of debt” because 
the value of the sold debts were not really known [12]. 
  
 
 
 
Therefore the result was that it was not just the selling of 
derivatives that caused the financial crisis, but the 
removal of regulations by governments in order to create 
the illusion of a booming economy. In removing the 
regulations politicians became permissible in allowing the 
financial crisis and the high returns that the traders 
received [13]. Altman [14], argues that trading in CDS 
was not in respect of credit risk management; rather it 
was trading and “betting on markets” in order to reap in 
large profits, which meant large bonuses. The best 
illustration of this is the „meteoric‟ increase of CDSs “from 
$5,000bn of CDS insurance outstanding in mid-2005 to 
$50,000bn two years later. This amount was 10 times 
greater than the total value of all bonds that could be 
insured.” Therefore, the growth did not result from the 
need to protect against defaults. This is supported by the 
2007 Fitch Ratings special report, “Market Volumes 
Continue While New Concerns Emerge”, where it was 
found that 58% trade in CDS as another trading asset 
class and not as a hedging vehicle (10%) [15]. Therefore, 
one can identify with the argument of [12,13] that there 
was political and financial self interest at work, because 
the result of deregulation in the derivatives market 
definitely contributed to a bust that was inevitable for 
such a large boom.  
Oak [16], confirms the above in an article in the 
„economic populist‟, which discusses the role derivatives 
played in the making of Greece‟s debt. He notes that 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a number of other 
banks helped the Greek and Italian politicians hide their 
borrowings by developing new instruments for this 
purpose. Furthermore, he argues that this is the reason 
why the reform on derivatives legislation has not 
happened. Oak [16] continues by noting that Goldman 
Sachs helped the government of Greece in 2001 borrow 
billions without exposing this fact to public view. This was 
since the transaction was not treated as a loan but as a 
currency trade. The country was able to meet Europe‟s 
monetary union minimum criteria and spend beyond what 
it could. In fact Weisenthal [17] in his report, condemns 
the Greek government who put the blame for the hike in 
interest rates that the country has to offer on the issue of 
debt on “traders and speculators,” calling for regulation 
on CDSs. He argues, that the CDSs market was not to 
blame for the Greek debt crisis and that it was mealy the 
long term spending by the Greek government, which he 
describes by the ancient Greek term “akrasia” meaning 
"out of control." Oak
16
 notes that derivatives are being 
used to keep debt off the books allowing countries to sell 
off/mortgage public property to raise the required capital 
(called sales and not loans) and questions the real value 
of the countries‟ debts. 
 
How influential was CDS Trading to the Financial 
Crisis? 
 
According to Orlowski [18], CDSs played a significant role 
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in the financial crisis, because they were being 
exchanged and sold creating a false profit. He notes, 
however, that in reality the value of these CDS and the 
returns on them were unknown and indicate that the 
elevated markets and credit risks were translating into 
liquidity and counterparty risks. The sever effects of this 
transmission were mostly felt by those institutions having 
a large exposure to the subprime mortgage market; in 
particular those that did not raise enough capital to 
reduce this excessive leverage. The increase in credit 
risk, meant the expansion of these unfunded derivatives 
(CDSs), while CDOs (the funded derivates) decreased. 
Moreover, as counterparty risk increased, extensive 
losses by large dealers of derivatives resulted (most 
notably, Bear Stearns) [18]. These CDS sales were 
based on the belief that they were risk free and liquid. 
This optimistic outlook, originated from the positive 
assessments made in the IMF Global Financial Stability 
Reports (2004 until April 2007) and the many other 
positive reports by various credit rating and supervisory 
agencies.  
Following the outbreak of the crisis, this belief of low 
credit risk and safe global financial markets, instruments 
and institutions, proved to be misleading [17]. The 
primary problem as Tremblay [12] argues, is that their 
value was manufactured. Therefore there was no 
liquidity. In fact the result was the creation of a false 
boom, based on a false credit bubble that popped when 
credit went unpaid, because risky lending continued in 
order to fund this high risk, by high return trading. 
Orlowski [18], refers to this as the wandering asset 
bubble, which consisted of “uncontrolled and 
unwarranted upward movement in the prices or over-
valuation” of varying asset classes including CDS [18]. 
Therefore, according to him CDS and derivatives played 
a very influential part of the global financial crisis, 
because this area was deregulated and open to be taken 
advantage of. 
  
Deregulation – A Key factor in the abuse of CDS 
Trading 
 
As Trembley, Crotty and Orlowski [12,13,18] argue, the 
deregulation of the derivatives market is a primary factor 
in the global financial crisis. Hence to stop a re-play, 
there needs to be the introduction of strong regulation 
and monitoring. Crotty [13], argues that the reason that 
CDS along with other unregulated derivative trading 
played a primary role in the global financial crisis, was to 
be found in the imperfect institutions and practices of the 
New Financial Architecture (NFA). He refers to this term 
(NFA) as the integration of modern day financial firms 
and markets with its associated regime of light 
government regulation. Crotty [13] argues that, as he 
puts it “the perfect calm” from 2003 to mid 2007, i.e. low 
interest rates, loan default rates, risk spreads and 
security price volatility, along with high profits and rising  
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stock prices, combined with NFA‟s structures and 
practices, led to the excesses that caused this crisis. 
They (NFA) encouraged aggressive risk taking (although 
not perceived as being risky), pushed some of the prices 
of securities to levels which were unsustainable, raised 
systemic leverage and created financial market 
complexity and opaqueness
13
. He also notes, that 
regulators did not only fail to prevent these excesses, but, 
assured investors that the high yields and low risk 
spreads of the period were permanent, making the risk of 
a crisis minimal [13]. Crotty [13], continued by arguing 
that it was not the sale of CDS and other derivatives that 
caused the financial crisis, but the lack of regulation in a 
sector, where it became standard practice to inflate high 
risk assets and sell them in order to create an illusion of 
financial growth to receive high returns [13].  
 
Is the Proposed Regulation Enough? 
 
This leads to the question whether the proposed 
regulation will be sufficient. Governments across the 
globe are calling for regulation of the derivatives market. 
However will this regulation be enough. For example, the 
European Commission as noted above is calling for; 
global standardisation; central data repositories; central 
counter party clearing; and trade execution on public 
trading venues [3]. The proposals by the EC are to create 
transparency and accountability, as well as to ensure that 
derivatives transactions such as the CDS are properly 
priced, can be traced in a public forum and there is no 
fictionalisation of these transactions. The commission‟s 
approach is however, that of incentivising the use of this 
framework; rather than strict regulation. In fact the 
European Commission report suggests that whenever it 
is possible, incentives should be drawn-up to ensure the 
wider use of CCPs in other OTC derivative markets [3]. 
This as Crotty
13
 argues, begs the question “if a particular 
framework or infrastructure would result in staving off 
unethical trading, then should it not be a prerequisite to 
trading, rather than an incentivised choice.” In fact, if one 
considers Crotty‟s arguments [13], it is evident that the 
problems were caused by allowing the derivatives traders 
to set their own regulation; rather than the trading in 
derivatives such as CDS. Therefore there needs to be a 
revamp of the regulatory regime in order “to restrain the 
risk-seeking behaviour of financial institutions.” This 
because the belief that self-regulation creates “efficient 
capital markets” is “seriously misleading” and “has 
generated excessive risk-taking through financial 
markets” where the “derivative products central to the 
boom were ticking time bombs as they could not be 
priced correctly” creating liquidity problems [13].  
Stulz [18], argues that the subprime mess, as he calls 
it, was not created by derivatives. However, he notes that 
the uncertainty about the derivatives risks created by the 
positions of some financial institutions worsened the 
panic that took place in 2008. Hence, in his opinion,  
 
 
 
 
mportant financial institutions‟ derivatives activities that 
might increase systemic risk should be regulated more 
effectively. Investors and regulators should have access 
to information on the counterparty risks incurred by these 
institutions. Moreover, regulators should be in a position 
to determine whether these financial institutions could 
survive the collapse of a major derivatives dealer.  
Stulz [19] is of the view that there has been an 
overstatement of the role of derivatives in bringing down 
Wall Street. He states that derivatives markets have for 
most part, worked well during the subprime crisis and 
allowed hedgers to sell off risks they were not well 
equipped to accept. He believes that rapid financial 
innovation was partly responsible for the growth in the 
global economy of the last three decades and notes that 
regulation that “obstructs innovation in the name of 
saving investors from the real and imagined danger of 
risk-taking would yield a high price” [19].  
Moreover, Stultz [19] notes that “derivatives markets 
are liquid because speculators and dealers are willing to 
take one side of the transaction.” If the market permits 
only hedging, then market prices cannot reflect all 
available information, since opportunities cannot be 
exploited by investors who look for profit and only little 
hedging can actually take place. In the long run, what 
would suffer is economic growth because of poorer 
allocation of capital. 
 
Internal Controls and the Financial Crisis 
 
Kirkpatrick [20] in his report „The Corporate Governance 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis‟, concludes that 
weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements can 
be one of the factors contributing to the financial crisis. 
He notes that corporate governance processes in many 
financial services companies did not manage to serve 
their purpose of safeguarding against unwarranted risk 
taking and several weaknesses have been highlighted.  
Corporate governance procedures and not the 
inadequacy of computer models alone were seen as the 
major player behind the failure of risk management 
systems. It was found that information about exposures in 
a number of cases was not communicated appropriately 
to the board and even senior levels of management and 
risk management‟s focus was mainly on activity, rather 
than on the enterprise as a whole [20]  
Kirkpatrick [20] notes that although in some cases 
boards had an approved strategy, suitable measures to 
monitor its implementation had not been determined. 
When put to test, it was determined that even though this 
was a key principle in internal control, disclosures by 
companies about identified risk factors and about how 
they monitored and managed risk, left a lot to be desired. 
Accounting standards and as we have already discussed 
above, regulatory requirements, have also proved to be 
insufficient. Moreover, it was also seen that the 
remuneration systems in many of the cases “was not  
 
 
 
 
closely related to the strategy, risk appetite of the 
company and its longer term interests” [20].  
In this report, Kirkpatrick [20] talks about the important 
role played by lower prestige and status of risk 
management staff vis-à-vis traders, highlighting that 
Société Générale [20], noted that there was a no 
standard process to centralise and escalate warning 
signs to the appropriate persons within the organisation. 
Moreover, he pointed out that the development of a 
responsible strong control function, to ensure transaction 
security and operational risk management, was not 
encouraged by the general environment. For the front 
office it was more important to increase its activities and 
did not bother with the need for controls. This created an 
imbalance between these activities and the control 
functions. Controllers were not able to create an 
independent critical scrutiny, which is necessary for their 
role. One of the goals of their action programme was to 
change this approach into one were responsibility is 
shared and there is a mutual respect between the 
users/managers and controllers [20]. “This inability of risk 
management staff to impose effective controls was also 
noted at Credit Suisse” [20].  
Kirkpatrick [20] notes that testimony by the HBOS‟s 
(that was rescued and taken over by Lloyds TSB) ex-
head of risk, illustrates this, by showing that bank 
management had little regard or care for risk 
management and was only interested in expanding its 
mortgage business. A SEC report about Bear Stearns, 
also noted that this closeness/mutual respect between 
risk managers and traders would imply a lack of 
independence [20]. Moreover, the Institute of 
International Finance study, cited in Kirkpatrick‟s report 
[20] concluded that the risk officer should have a 
mandate to attract to the attention of all management or 
the board, when there is a situation that could materially 
violate the risk guidelines/parameters set. This will 
ensure a strong and independent voice [20].  
Kirkpatrick‟s report [20] cites the Guerra and Thal-
Larsen‟s report which highlights the fact that bank boards‟ 
lack banking and financial experience. This can be 
considered as a reason why immediate attention to 
foreseeable risk was not given. In fact, in one of the 
studies it was “estimated that at eight US major financial 
institutions, two thirds of the directors had no banking 
experience” and many of them sat on committees 
covering audit and risk. However, Kirkpatrick [20] noted 
that banking experience is clearly not enough and relates 
that Northern Rock had two board members with banking 
experience; while at Bear Stearns seven out of thirteen 
directors had a banking background. In his opinion this 
might be caused by the idea that boards are a “retirement 
home for the great and the good” [20].  
Another problem noted in Kirkpatrick‟s report [20] was 
that many times risk managers were being involved in 
advising on how to structure the instrument so as to 
obtain a required rating; this posed serious conflicts of  
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interest. Similarly, to auditors they should not be 
controlling or reporting on their own work, or in this case 
rating an instrument that they had themselves advised on 
how to structure.  
On the other hand Jenkins [21] explains that the 
processes of corporate governance worked as expected 
and refutes claims that it might have caused the financial 
crisis. He notes that the core problem was the belief that 
government will intervene and bail them out no matter 
what the bank‟s did or their pay-off was. This belief, in his 
opinion incentivised bank creditors to oversupply 
leverage and not as should have, incentivised 
managements to produce competitive returns. He 
continues to argue that the core problem was the 
guarantees given by government; like the insurances on 
deposits and implied guarantees, like the reasoning that 
the government would intervene, not allowing any one of 
the Fannie or Freddie to collapse and like the belief that 
some banks were “too big to be allowed to fail,” which 
meant that the main actors could pass on this risk to the 
taxpayer21. Therefore, as he sees it, the fact that top 
management and the boards did this, evidenced that 
corporate governance worked. Jenkins [21] continues 
using an analogy of a gun used to commit murder and 
compares it to the corporate governance tool. The gun 
did not fail but was improperly used and it (the gun) does 
not need fixing, but people should be given incentives to 
use it properly. 
 
Further Thoughts  
 
As noted in this article, the financial crisis has exposed 
the failures in business procedures and models. 
However, the world is still speculating on whether or not 
the financial sector will actually regain its position in the 
economy and whether the world will survive this crisis. 
Proposals have come forth, from countries such as the 
US and the UK, entities such as the EU, BIS, G20 and 
the IMF and institutions such as ISDA and IOSCO. These 
have put forward thoughts, arguments and opinions 
which need to be discussed further. This since the 
financial crisis is much too complex and cannot possibly 
be oversimplified and reduced to a single cause or a few 
factors. Moreover, it would be naive to hope to solve this 
crisis or prevent future ones by some simple remedy [22]. 
A survey carried out in 2010 by the International 
Association of Financial Engineers (IAFE) together with 
SunGard Adaptiv, gathered some of the thoughts, 
arguments and opinions of market experts which included 
senior fellows, academics, practitioners and members of 
the board of directors of IAFE about the crisis, what 
brought it on and what safeguards are best to prevent 
another similar fall [22].  
The experts were not convinced by the claim that the 
system was not able to cope with the complexity of the 
financially engineered products (OTC derivatives). 
Several of them held the view that the inability of systems  
274               Online J Soc Sci Res 
 
 
 
and management to deal with the large losses in a short 
span of time was the main problem. They noted that this 
resulted because firms lost more capital than they 
expected too and at the same time needed to reduce 
leverage. Many of the participants to the survey 
commented that “Knee-jerk” responses by the regulators 
to limit the use of complex derivatives can be damaging. 
In fact, one of the participants in the survey, John Hull a 
finance academic and author of financial books echoed 
this argument by noting that regulating OTC markets 
would not prevent similar future crises since “it was 
caused by a mixture of macroeconomic events, 
government policies, the relaxation of mortgage lending 
standards in the US, and a failure of regulation” [22]. 
Participants were generally in favour of particular 
technical improvements, which were well thought. Many 
of the surveyed risk panel supported the call to move 
towards central clearing parties (CCPs) and standardised 
OTC transactions. However, they doubted that it could be 
the cure to the problems. Some others commented that 
complexity cannot be looked at in isolation, but one has 
to look at the ability of the systems and processes in 
place to deal with it. Often it is found that different areas 
within a system have not developed at the same speed. 
For example, the front office vs the controllers. The 
responsibility to ensure this has to be taken by management 
[22].  
The infrastructure, supervisory oversight and 
governance within firms lagged the market (without 
excuse on the part of firms themselves, regulators should 
be allowed some lag due to staffing and resource 
constraints). In my opinion it is the responsibility of senior 
management and boards to ensure that firms engage in 
activities that are in accord with their abilities, capabilities 
and infrastructure [22]. 
Leslie Rahl, an IAEF Board Member and Practitioner, 
argued that this complexity should be taken into 
consideration when calculating risk (i.e. incorporating this 
into the capital calculations and other risk metrics used) 
and unless strictly necessary should be avoided. 
However, Andrew Weisman, also a Board member of 
IAEF and a Practitioner, viewed “better pricing” and 
“improved risk controls” to be the better solution to 
complexity [22].  
Stephen Figlewski an academic and a board member 
of IAEF, noted that “outlawing” complexity was not 
possible and the move should be towards changing the 
organizational and technological aspects. In fact, Tanya 
Beder commented that the cost to the economies would 
be higher if the “financial engineering genie is put back in 
the bottle,” than if the requirements for firms using 
complex products are increased and penalties are set for 
management who claim to be ignorant of the firms‟ 
doings. She continues to argue that regulators should ask 
more from senior management and their boards and 
highlights the need for “risk-weighted capital” measures 
to be set on risk taking [22]. 
Most of the participants noted that proper training and 
 
 
 
 
incentives to senior management could be the main 
defence to the creation of systemic risk by complexity of 
products. This in their opinion would do more than 
additional restrictions or capital charges would do to 
control the problem. In fact, Andrew Weisman notes that 
senior management, who may be involved in taking risks 
by using complex securities, should be required to have 
the necessary training or knowledge to understand the 
risks taken by the firms they are managing. Moreover, 
Tanya Beder noted that risk taking is effected by whether 
or not senior management and/or the board of directors 
understand what is going on in the firms they are 
managing [22]. 
Andrew Weisman agreed to most of the participants 
that “too big to be allowed to fail” was a problem, but he 
continued that a larger problem was “too connected to 
fail”. According to participants, it seems that size is 
making the measurement of risk imperfect, since these 
firms are perceived to be guaranteed bailout by the 
government. This gives firms the incentive to take on 
more risk [22]. 
John Hull criticised the regulators who put political 
pressure on accountants between 2008 and 2009 to 
allow exceptions on accounting standards of FAS 157 
and IAS 39. He felt that this enabled further risk taking. 
John Hull continued to argue against those who describe 
OTC markets as “dark markets” with little transparency. 
He noted that there are various on-line services such as 
Bloomberg and Reuters, which do a good job to 
disseminate information about trade prices to the markets 
and although it is correct to say that quoted prices of 
these products vary widely, it is not something that 
regulators should worry about. However, most participants 
on the panel surveyed, agreed to the opinion that 
supervisors/regulators need to have access to data from 
firms that could trigger-off systemic risk. However, they 
were sceptical about the ability of the users of this data, 
to use it appropriately and achieve the required results [22]. 
Not many of the respondents showed confidence that a 
future financial crisis can be avoided with regulations and 
new systems. However, they noted that techniques and 
understanding could be improved by for example the use 
of “stress testing” in risk management. John Hull noted 
that the problem with the use of certain techniques such 
as VaR, although a very useful tool, was that it replaced 
experience and judgement to form an opinion on worst 
case scenarios. Here gaps in culture and experience 
were brought to light. In fact, it was noted that in many 
organizations there are gaps in the level of quantitative 
insight of senior managers, the board, the quants and 
product structuring staff and their risk culture [22]. As 
noted by Stephen Figlewski an IAFE Member and 
Academic, “improving a risk culture could only happen 
when institutions realise that not losing $1 million is just 
as valuable to a firm as making $1 million” [22].  
In conclusion all respondents agreed that a global 
approach to tackle the issue of systemic risk was needed 
and that this had to be harmonised in order to have a 
 
 
 
 
level playing field and avoid regulatory arbitrage.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many factors contributed to the quick deterioration in 
credit markets and large losses and this has been 
attributed to one single main factor that put the whole 
global financial system on a danger list to collapse. This 
was the massive interlocking web of OTC derivatives 
exposures amongst the largest swaps users. The world 
during the crisis has seen a number of financial 
institutions going bankrupt and suffering large losses, but 
to take down the entire financial system would have 
taken more than just this. Moreover, some suggest that 
there would not have been any threatening effect if it 
were not for the completely unregulated OTC complex 
markets and their lack of transparency. 
Some, have stressed the argument, that derivatives 
were in fact responsible for hitting the economy while it 
was down, with the extreme instability and synthetic price 
hikes they helped generate in the vital commodities 
markets, which included food and energy.  
They argued that both of these problems could have 
been noted and mitigated if derivatives were 
appropriately regulated. In their opinion a centralised 
clearing system with novation, for credit derivatives would 
have removed the systemic risk factor, since they would 
have provided a central counterparty to all transactions 
and increased transparency. In combination with 
aggregate speculative position limits, this would have 
discouraged manipulation and excessive speculation that 
propagated excessive volatility in commodities markets. 
However, as others argue, unless the regulation is 
properly incorporated into the derivatives market through 
a new infrastructure, then this new regulation will have 
little effect. Therefore, others are implying that it was not 
necessarily the derivatives that caused the financial 
global crisis; rather a mixture of the exploitation of the 
NFA self regulatory model by unethical traders. This was 
compounded by the fact that the financial structure 
allowed the financial institutions to set inflated prices on 
derivatives with unknown values, such as CDS. Thus, 
what is being said is that in order for the proposed regulation 
to have any effect, there needs to be transparency and 
accountability as proposed by the European Commission 
and also an external regulatory framework that stops 
unethical traders. The reason for this is that traders have 
shown that they cannot be self-regulated, because the 
result was exploitation, wrong perceptions and greed, 
which destabilises the global financial markets.  
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